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   Abstract 
This paper claims that the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) of the EU, and in 
particular the elements related to justice and home affairs (JHA), is a complex, 
multilayered initiative that incorporates different logics and instruments. To unravel the 
various layers of the policy, the paper proceeds in three steps: firstly, it lays out some facts 
pertaining to the origins of the ENP, as its ‘origins’ arguably account for a number of the 
core tensions. It then presents the underlying logic and objectives attributed to JHA 
cooperation, which can be derived from the viewpoints voiced during policy formulation. 
The paper goes on to argue that despite the existence of different logics, there is a unifying 
objective, which is to ‘extra-territorialise’ the management of ‘threats’ to the 
neighbouring countries. The core of the paper presents the various policy measures that 
have been put in place to achieve external ‘threat management’. In this context it is 
argued that the ’conditionality-inspired policy instruments’, namely monitoring and 
benchmarking of progress, transfer of legal and institutional models to non-member states 
and inter-governmental negotiations, contain socialisation elements that rely on the 
common values approach. This mix of conditionality and socialisation instruments is 
illustrated in two case studies, one on the fight against terrorism and one on irregular 
migration. Finally, the paper recommends that the EU draft an Action-Oriented Paper 
(AOP) on JHA cooperation with the ENP countries that indicates how the EU intends to 
balance the conflicting objectives and instruments that are currently present in the JHA 
provisions of the ENP. 
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THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN  
JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS AND  
THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY: 
TAKING STOCK OF THE LOGIC, OBJECTIVES & PRACTICES 
NICOLE WICHMANN* 
Introduction 
This paper deals with the justice and home affairs (JHA) elements of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). It refutes the core argument advanced by some analysts that the 
ENP is essentially a comprehensive cross-pillar security initiative
1 by showing that its 
objectives as well as its instruments are also inspired by common values. This is not to deny that 
the JHA and security elements play a pivotal role in the ENP as a whole, for they definitely do. 
The assertion that it is all about security, however, is too simplistic. This paper claims that the 
ENP, and in particular the JHA elements, is a complex, multilayered initiative that incorporates 
different logics and instruments. In dissecting the various layers, which is the main objective of 
the paper, we draw on the findings contained in the literature on the external aspects of JHA and 
on the ENP.
2  
This paper proceeds in three steps. Firstly, it lays out some facts pertaining to the origins of the 
ENP, as its ‘origins’ arguably account for a number of the core tensions. It then presents the 
underlying logic and objectives attributed to JHA cooperation, which can be derived from the 
viewpoints voiced during policy formulation. Finally, the paper goes on to argue that despite the 
existence of different logics, there is a unifying objective, which is to ‘extra-territorialise’ the 
management of ‘threats’ to the neighbouring countries. Didier Bigo and other scholars have 
argued that the specific manner in which JHA cooperation was institutionalised within the EU 
led to the consideration of a broad range of internal security threats under one and the same 
heading (Bigo, 1994; Huysmans, 2000). Hence, JHA actors were responsible for managing a 
‘broad spectrum of issues’ ranging from terrorism, drugs and crime to the rights of asylum 
seekers and clandestine migration. The term ‘security continuum’ describes this broad 
understanding of threats. The external dimension of JHA also addresses the entire spectrum. 
The core of the paper presents the various policy measures that have been put in place for 
external ‘threat management’. In this context it is argued that the ’conditionality inspired policy 
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instruments’ of monitoring and benchmarking of progress, transfer of legal and institutional 
models to non-member states and inter-governmental negotiations are accompanied by 
socialisation instruments. The mix of the two logics of action will be explicated in two case 
studies, one on the fight against terrorism and one on irregular migration. 
Generally speaking, the paper addresses the question of the EU’s actorness with respect to JHA 
in the neighbourhood. To assess actorness, we scrutinise the objectives and policy instruments 
contained in the JHA sections of the ENP. The reasoning underlying this choice of focus is that 
an actor is expected to devise appropriate means to reach certain stated objectives. It will be 
shown that the requirement of actorness is only partially fulfilled, as the policy measures 
promoted respond to both security and common values objectives, and draw on both 
conditionality and social learning instruments. As a consequence a creative tension arises 
between the various objectives and instruments inherent in JHA cooperation with the ENP 
countries. The main objective promoted from the security perspective is that of punctually 
strengthening the repressive state functions, whereas the socialisation discourse emphasises the 
long-term objective of enhancing the democratic structures of a state. In terms of the policy 
instruments this tension is mirrored in the reliance on both conditionality and socialisation-
inspired instruments.  
The main policy recommendation flowing from this paper is that the EU should explicitly 
engage with the question of actorness in the ENP by drawing up an Action-Oriented Paper 
(AOP) on JHA cooperation with the ENP countries which enumerates both the objectives and 
the policy instruments available in this area. An AOP on the ENP countries would need to take 
into account both the JHA external dimension ‘security’ objectives, while simultaneously 
engaging with the questions of security sector governance and the human rights compliance 
records of the partner countries. It should also provide an overview of all of the policy measures 
currently used in the relations with the ENP countries. By attempting to match the strategic 
objectives and the available instruments in one policy framework, the EU would take an 
important step towards affirming itself as an international actor. To avoid contradiction, 
guidelines would need to be formulated on how to deal with possible trade-offs between 
conflicting objectives. 
The analysis focuses on the various Action Plans of the ENP in pursuit of a two-fold objective: 
to present the Action Plans concluded with the ENP countries in a comparative perspective and 
to illustrate some of the instruments in-depth to show what they cover. The illustrations are 
based on the Action Plans adopted with Morocco, Moldova, Tunisia and Ukraine. The four 
countries were selected, because they have long-standing relations with the EU, and because 
they are all interested in deepening their relations with the EU. Moreover, this country sample 
allows us to present some interesting variations as to how the policy is being implemented in 
practice. This paper is the result of an intensive study of ENP documents and a series of semi-
structured interviews conducted by the author with policy makers in Brussels during a stay at 
CEPS in April/May 2007.  
1. ‘Policy  discourses’
3 surrounding the JHA elements in the ENP: 
Security versus common values and socialisation? 
The political science literature on the ENP has mainly focused on the question of whether the 
ENP applies the methods of enlargement to countries without a membership perspective or 
whether it constitutes a ‘cross-pillar’ comprehensive security initiative. Both strands of 
literature construct their arguments by relying on the policy formulation stage. There appears to 
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be a broad consensus among academics that the birth of the ENP was the result of a process of 
inter- and intra-institutional bargaining. The main discussions centred on which countries 
should be covered and what should be offered to the non-member states (Del Sarto & 
Schumacher, 2005). The result of this bargaining process was a broad geographical coverage, 
which extended the reach of the policy to all ‘neighbouring countries’ without a membership 
perspective,
4 with the exception of Libya, Syria and Belarus. The incentives offered to the non-
member states differ a lot from country to country.  
The origins of the ENP are to be found in a number of discussions that took place in 2002. One 
of the most important inputs into the discussion was the letter written by Jack Straw, former 
British Foreign Minister, to his colleague, J. Piqué, Foreign Minister of Spain, which held the 
EU presidency at the time (Johansson-Nogués, 2007: 3). The letter is unambiguous in asserting 
the security motivations that should drive the EU’s policy towards its ‘New Neighbours’; it 
qualifies the Neighbourhood as both a source and a transit zone of ‘soft security’ threats to 
Europe. The speeches delivered by Romano Prodi in 2002 and 2003 on the ENP convey a 
different message, which more closely resembles the conceptualisation of the ENP as a socio-
economic transformation project. In line with this latter view, the policy towards the ‘New 
Neighbours’ should be based on the principle of partnership.
5 Analysts have come to agree that, 
as time passes, the security-related features of the ENP became more accentuated. There are a 
number of reasons why the ‘security rationale’ was strengthened during subsequent phases. 
Among them figured the adoption of the European Security Strategy in December 2003, the 
occurrence of inter-institutional differences between the Commission and the Council in spring 
2004, and a broadened intra-institutional consultation process within the Commission. As a 
consequence of this broadened intra-institutional consultation, a wider spectrum of sectoral 
Directorate Generals became involved in the drafting process (Jeandesboz, 2007: 10-15). The 
security approach advocates that the EU should coerce partner states into acting as 
’gatekeepers’ to prevent the spill over of security threats into the EU. As mentioned previously, 
it is not the purpose of this paper to deny the enhanced security rationale embedded in the ENP; 
rather, it refutes the idea that the ENP is only about security. The argument is sustained by 
showing that even the most security-relevant provisions of the ENP, namely those related to 
JHA, contain remnants of the ‘common values and socialisation’ policy discourse (common 
values and socialisation approach).  
A further reason for rejecting the uni-dimensional security reading stems from the conviction 
that the EU is engaged in a strategy of ‘depoliticising’ the discussions on JHA issues in the 
relations with non-member states.
6 Evidence for the de-politicisation strategy can be found on 
both the institutional level, for example the decision to assign the responsibility for dealing with 
JHA questions to a Sub-Committee of internal security experts instead of a political body, and 
on the substantive level, where we find numerous attempts to discuss political problems in 
technical terms. The pressure exerted on Moldova to adopt a new Customs Regime imposing 
registration requirements on companies domiciled in Transnistria, and the launching of the EU 
Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) are attempts at devising technical solutions to the 
Transnistria conflict (Sushko, 2006).
7 The EU’s preference for a strategy of de-politicisation 
results from its own ‘integration’ experience. We need to note from the outset that the success 
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of this strategy heavily depends on the willingness of the partner country to engage with the 
EU’s terms of dialogue.  
The JHA sections in the ENP also have to be understood in the context of the development of an 
external dimension of JHA. It is interesting to note that the discourse surrounding the external 
aspects of JHA is characterised by the same ambiguity as the ENP, and this is the reason why it 
perpetuates the tensions identified previously. By and large the development of the external 
aspects of JHA has been characterised by, on the one hand, the insertion of JHA clauses in the 
broader external relations framework, and on the other hand, the adoption of JHA-specific 
external instruments. That these two developments are not inherently complementary has been 
pointed out by a number of analysts (Berthelet, 2007). In terms of the inclusion of JHA 
elements in the external dimension framework, we have witnessed the progressive inclusion of 
JHA cooperation clauses in all agreements with non-member countries since the conclusion of 
the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements in the early 1990s. In parallel to the progressive 
development of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice internally, a broadening of the scope 
of the JHA clauses in agreements with non-member states has occurred. The JHA clauses in the 
most recent Association Agreement, concluded with Algeria, are exemplary with respect to the 
comprehensiveness of the issues covered.
8 We have also witnessed the adoption of ‘JHA’-
specific external instruments, such as the Action Plan on Organised Crime with Russia, the 
Action Plan on JHA concluded with Ukraine, or the Valencia Regional Action Programme 
(Council of the European Union, 2000; 2003; Presidency, 2002). On the whole the activities in 
the external dimension have been driven by the EU’s security priorities, both in terms of issues 
and countries covered. At the end of 2005, a more strategic vision, expressed in the 2005 
Commission Communication on the external dimension of JHA and the 2005 Council Strategy, 
came to complement the problem-driven and piecemeal case-to-case approach, which had 
dominated the external dimension of JHA until then (Council of the European Union, 2005; 
European Commission, 2005a).  
2.  The logic and objectives underlying the JHA sections of the ENP 
This section advances the argument that the ambiguities resulting from the various policy 
discourses are reflected in the logic and objectives underlying the JHA sections of the ENP. One 
of the basic assumptions underlying this argument is that among all policy areas figuring in the 
ENP, JHA is the one area in which the existence of the two policy discourses has a direct impact 
on actions. The reason for this is that no other policy area is so directly linked to the presence of 
‘shared values’. It has been claimed that the manner in which a state exercises its prerogatives in 
the area of JHA is one of the most telling indicators of the nature of a political regime. 
Therefore, cooperation on JHA matters with a non-member state should be made contingent on 
the existence of shared values (Knelangen, 2007: 261). The policy discourse of the ENP as a 
transformation project engages directly with this imperative, as it advocates establishing 
security and stability democratisation and rule of law promotion in the partner countries. This 
approach is reflected prominently in the Country Reports, which the Commission adopted prior 
to the Action Plans. The latter devoted a lot of space to listing the deficiencies of the partner 
countries in the core areas of democracy and rule of law. In the ENP Action Plans we therefore 
find a number of provisions on strengthening the judiciary and eradicating corruption. 
Nevertheless, the detailed actions in the Action Plans and the first progress reports reveal that – 
particularly in relations with the Mediterranean countries – the EU is not serious about progress 
on these questions (Del Sarto et al., 2006). This half-hazard stance on rule of law and 
democracy issues is worrying, if one takes into account the mixed record of the neighbouring 
                                                      
8 For an overview of how JHA has been inserted into the relations with basically all countries on the 
globe, see Trauner (2006). THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN JHA & THE ENP | 5 
 
countries on rule of law and democracy questions and the EU’s attempts to strengthen 
cooperation with these same countries on JHA issues.
9  
The reason why the EU is keen to improve cooperation with the neighbouring countries on 
internal security questions is the high degree of security interdependence it is experiencing with 
the Neighbourhood (Lavenex, 2004; Occhipinti, 2007). When examining the organised crime 
reports, this threat perception becomes apparent, provided that the reports point to the pivotal 
role that the neighbouring countries play as source and transit countries of security threats to the 
EU (Council of Europe, 2004; Europol, 2004a). Hence there is a strong ‘functional’ argument 
that the EU should engage more substantively with these countries in order to prevent the spill 
over of insecurity to the EU (Knelangen, 2007: 266). This reasoning underlies the JHA actions 
that call for targeted capacity-building in the area of border management and the enhancement 
of non-member countries’ risk analysis and information-gathering capacities. These very 
concrete, short-term and punctual measures aim to enhance the non-member states’ capacities in 
managing threats to the EU’s security in the short term. They do not, however, engage in 
questions of ‘security governance’ or the oversight of the security sector (Kahl, 2006: 298; 
Tanner, 2005). In other words, one could claim that activities launched under the JHA external 
dimension can either reinforce the repressive elements, which constitute the power basis of 
autocratic regimes, or they can contribute to fostering state structures based on the respect for 
the rule of law and democracy.  
It is beyond doubt that a policy framework that has been influenced and motivated by various 
interests and imperatives, such as the JHA sections in the ENP, sends out contradictory 
messages to the neighbouring countries. What is worrying is not the fact that there are tensions; 
these are probably unavoidable. Nevertheless, it would be desirable that the European 
institutions formulate political guidelines on how to deal with the ‘inherent’ pay-offs between 
the long-term ‘security through democracy’ strategy and the short-term one of ‘enhancing a 
partner country’s capacities to manage threats to the EU’s security’ (Kahl, 2006: 294-298). In 
the absence of such guidelines, tensions will arise between the EU’s long-term strategy of 
eliminating the root causes of security threats by promoting democracy and the rule of law, and 
the short-term requirements of cooperating with autocratic regimes in the fight against terrorism 
and illegal immigration (Wolff, 2006a). Since we cannot identify any guidelines, we are led to 
conclude that the implementation of the JHA provisions will constitute a credibility test for the 
EU as an international actor in the Neighbourhood. In other words, implementation will reveal 
which considerations prevail.  
This leads us to formulating the policy recommendation that the EU should draw up an AOP on 
JHA cooperation with the ENP countries outlining the cooperation objectives in this area. The 
document should spell out, on the one hand, the JHA external dimension cooperation objectives 
and on the other hand, it should address human rights and rule of law compliance and the 
security sector governance situation in the respective partner country. The AOP should also 
contain some guidelines on which trade-offs are to be made between the security and the norms 
promotion objectives and the various instruments. A further reason why the EU should draw up 
an AOP is that it would consolidate in one document both the objectives and the instruments of 
JHA cooperation with the ENP countries. Such a framework is necessary, because one 
prerequisite of actorness is a manifested attempt to match policy objectives with instruments. In 
the process, the EU should also attempt to eliminate as many inconsistencies as possible to 
make its actions more coherent. 
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It is interesting to note that the AOPs are unilateral instruments, and hence they primarily reflect 
the EU’s security interests.
10 The predominantly security-oriented approach advocated in the 
AOPs can be seen as an expression of the EU’s ambition to extra-territorialise the management 
of security threats to partner countries, a strategy that we present in the next section. 
Nevertheless, one needs to be aware of the fact that although there exists a unified aim to ‘extra-
territorialise’ the management of threats, the EU relies on two opposing logics of action, 
conditionality and social learning, to realise its ambitions. The measures through which the EU 
seeks to achieve these objectives will be presented in the subsequent sections of this paper. 
3. Extra-territorialisation 
In the academic literature one finds the terms ‘external governance’ and ‘externalisation’ to 
describe how European norms and rules produce effects beyond the EU’s borders (Lavenex & 
Uçarer, 2004; Rijpma & Cremona, 2007: 9). The term ‘extra-territorialisation’ was developed 
by Cremona and Rijpma to describe “the means by which the EU attempts to push back the 
EU’s external borders or rather to police them at distance in order to control unwanted 
migration flows” (Rijpma & Cremona, 2007: 10). For the purpose of this paper the scope of the 
definition needs to be extended to the management of all security threats, provided that a similar 
assumption underlies all JHA external activities. There are different ways in which extra-
territorialisation can occur: firstly, it refers to action taken by the EU itself, independently of 
non-member states, that can have effects on the legal order of non-member states and their 
nationals.
11 Secondly, it may take place in a context of external Community action.
12 And in the 
context of the EU’s relations with the partners, it may describe the promotion of the EU’s own 
acquis towards non-member states, and their adoption of it into their own legal order (Rijpma & 
Cremona, 2007: 10-13). The conceptual approach of ‘extra-territorialisation’ has the merit of 
grasping what the EU is attempting to achieve in the JHA sections of the ENP.  
4.  Policy measures contained in the ENP Action Plans 
This ‘core’ section of the paper presents the policy measures that are contained in the JHA 
sections of the ENP Action Plans. The measures will be classified according to a categorisation 
applied by Florian Trauner – who had taken over from Heather Grabbe – to JHA cooperation 
with the countries of the Western Balkans (Trauner, 2007; Grabbe, 2003).
13 In the literature on 
the ENP there is a wide spread consensus that the EU is attempting to emulate the use of the 
conditionality approach in its relations with the ENP countries (Cremona, 2005; Tulmets, 2007). 
Conditionality can be used in the context of the membership prospect, at the sectoral level, or at 
the project level. In the case of sector or project conditionality, the EU links the granting of 
(financial) incentives to the commitment of the partner country to carry out certain political or 
                                                      
10 The unilateral nature derives from the fact that they are Council adopted instruments that are not 
submitted to approval by the partner countries. The security motivations become apparent, when 
considering the issues and countries mentioned in the AOPs adopted to date (organised crime in the 
Balkans, drugs from Afghanistan, organised crime in Russia). The AOP seem to reflect the threat 
perceptions contained in the internal security reports issued by the security agencies of the EU and the 
member states (e.g. Europol, BKA, etc.). 
11 Examples cited in this context are the EU’s visa policy or the rules on carrier sanctions (Cremona & 
Rijpma, 2007: 11). 
12 In this context, liaison officer networks, the determination of safe non-member states, the conduct of 
joint Frontex operations and the need for third countries to cooperate with the EU to return their nationals 
are cited (Cremona & Rijmpa, 2007: 12). 
13 An alternative way to classify these measures is the use of the external governance approach that we 
have been developing in the framework of the Newgov project. See Lavenex et al. (2007). THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN JHA & THE ENP | 7 
 
administrative reforms. The ENP’s documents differentiate between negative conditionality and 
positive conditionality. Positive conditionality is based on the idea that the EU offers rewards to 
non-member states for fulfilling reforms, instead of threatening to withhold a promised benefit 
in case of non-compliance. As the membership prospect is absent in the ENP, the EU needs to 
increasingly rely on positive conditionality to entice states to move closer to European 
standards. 
Since enlargement is considered by many as the most successful foreign policy of the EU, it is 
obvious that the EU tries to emulate elements of this policy in its dealings with countries outside 
the circle of the accession countries (Kelley, 2006). During enlargement the EU used both logics 
of action, whereby that of conditionality seems to have prevailed in fostering adaptation 
pressures (Kelley, 2004; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). We allege that in the case of the 
ENP, conditionality is the dominant logic of action, but that we also find socialisation elements. 
This argumentative step moves us away from the analysis conducted by Trauner, who presents 
the instruments deployed in the relations with the Western Balkans countries as based 
exclusively upon conditionality (Trauner, 2007). Conditionality stipulates that actors act in 
accordance with a ‘logic of consequentiality’, which means that the decision whether or not to 
cooperate with the EU is the consequence of a partner country conducting a cost/benefit analysis 
(March & Olsen, 1989). The alternative logic of action, i.e. socialisation, stipulates that non-
member states can be enticed to follow the EU’s model, because they identify with the values 
and norms promoted by the EU. The logic of socialisation is based on the belief that actors 
change their conduct in accordance with the ‘logic of appropriateness’. There is a broad 
consensus in the literature that for the ENP to be successful in the absence of the membership 
prospect, the EU needs to increasingly rely on this type of instrument, at least with respect to the 
political elements (Jones & Emerson, 2005: 18-19). In the JHA area, social learning is used both 
as a vehicle for fostering norm adoption and compliance, and to enhance the level of policy 
implementation. 
Efforts to transfer the EU’s approach to internal security to the ENP countries through soft 
measures and learning can be detected at all levels. In the context of benchmarking and 
monitoring, the socialisation element manifests itself through the search for a common 
understanding of internal security and security threats. When promoting legislative and 
institutional models to partner countries, socialisation is used to discuss the needs and the 
approximation wishes of the partner countries. Technical assistance or capacity-building by 
definition intends to trigger social learning effects. Lastly, through negotiations the EU attempts 
to change the cost/benefit calculation of the partner country. As the EU cannot withhold or grant 
membership to the ENP countries, it needs to modify the incentive structure that the partner 
country is facing within the area of JHA. In other words, the EU needs to make cooperation on 
JHA issues more attractive for the partner countries. To achieve this objective, the EU devises a 
mixture of measures drawing on socialisation and conditionality, as we will show in the two 
mini case studies on irregular migration and terrorism. 
4.1  ‘Benchmarking and monitoring’ 
The ENP Action Plans are meant to incorporate the principles of benchmarking. The EU first 
experimented with benchmarking in the area of employment policy. Raffaella Del Sarto has 
defined it as follows: “benchmarking is a system that aims at comparing in a systematic manner 
organisational processes and/or performances with the objective of improving these processes 
and thus creating new and (higher) standards (Del Sarto et al., 2006: 14).” The ENP has 
introduced benchmarking into the realm of the EU’s foreign policy (Tulmets, 2007). In the 
context of external relations the term is firstly, associated with the idea of continuous evaluation 
and comparison between the participants in the process; secondly, it relies on clear pre-8 | NICOLE WICHMANN 
 
determined criteria, in particular goals and objectives for evaluating progress, and thirdly, it 
draws on soft law (Del Sarto et al., 2006: 14 ff.). The ENP Action Plans incorporate some of the 
features of benchmarking, because they contain precise commitments that the partner countries 
seek to attain over a given time frame (short, medium or long term). The Action Plans were 
elaborated based on the European Commission’s Country Reports. 
The ENP Action Plans reflect the priorities expressed by the EU and the partner country. 
Participants in the negotiation process confirmed that both sides had a say in defining the 
priority actions in the Action Plans.
14 In the area of JHA, the priority actions concern 
‘readmission’ and migration management. Border management is also listed as a priority in the 
relations with Morocco, Ukraine and Moldova. In the Mediterranean countries there are 
numerous references to intensifying the fight against terrorism. The strengthening of rule of law, 
and of administrative and judiciary capacity also features as a priority action in all of the Action 
Plans. In terms of wording and targets we find more precise formulations in the sections on 
border management and enhancing security than on governance-related matters. Moreover, the 
first two years of implementation have revealed a focus on the security questions, provided that 
agreements on readmission/visa facilitation have been initialled with both Ukraine and 
Moldova. In addition, the border management mission (EUBAM) was launched in 
Ukraine/Moldova, and the dialogue on terrorism with the Mediterranean countries has 
intensified (European Commission, 2006a). The progress in terms of rule of law, political and 
administrative reforms has been slower in all of the partner countries.  
The ENP Action Plans are not legally binding; they complement the provisions of the 
Association and Partnership and Cooperation Agreements as ‘soft law’. The monitoring of 
progress has both bilateral and a unilateral elements. On the bilateral level the bodies 
established under the Association Agreements (AA) and the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements (PCA) are responsible for discussing progress. There is also a unilateral component 
to monitoring progress under the ENP, in that the Commission draws up regular implementation 
reports. From a formal point of view, the institutional provisions of the Action Plans look very 
much alike, with the exception that the PCA structures cannot adopt binding decisions, whilst 
the Association Councils have the competence to do so (Lannon & van Elsuwege, 2004: 55). 
The responsibility for monitoring the JHA provisions is attributed to a Sub Committee on 
Justice, Freedom and Security in the relations with the Eastern neighbours. In the relations with 
the Southern neighbours the responsibility for JHA matters is split between the Sub Committee 
on Justice and Security and the one on Migration and Social Affairs. In contrast to the formal 
provisions, practice has revealed important differences in terms of the intensity of the relations.
  
The JHA Action Plan adopted with Ukraine in 2001 and updated in 2006 contains a plethora of 
detailed measures
15 and an accompanying monitoring instrument, the so-called scoreboard. 
Progress on JHA issues is discussed at regular meetings on JHA issues, which take place 
between officials at all levels of seniority. There is even a Ministerial Troika on JHA issues, 
which is convened at regular intervals with Ukraine. The discussions in the Sub-Committee 
meetings on JHA have evolved substantially since the first meeting in 2002. Whilst in the early 
days the discussions were of a more general nature, nowadays the Sub Committee meetings are 
focused. The Sub Committee is used as a forum for discussing technical details and 
implementation problems. This is by far the most intensive relation between an ENP partner 
                                                      
14 Information received in confidential interviews with third country representations (Brussels, May 
2007). 
15 The revised EU-Ukraine Action Plan on Freedom, Security and Justice: Challenges and Strategic Aims 
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country and the EU in the area of JHA. At the opposite end of the spectrum one can situate the 
relations with Tunisia. Both the limited number of obligations subscribed to by this country and 
the fact that the Sub-Committee on Justice and Security has not yet been able to convene, point 
towards the difficulties the EU is facing in strengthening cooperation with this country on JHA 
questions. The relations with Moldova and Morocco are situated between the two extremes.
16 
Sub Committee meetings and other working party meetings are being held with both countries. 
The discussions with the two countries have bypassed the stage of ‘pure monologue’ and are 
moving towards a policy dialogue. The two countries are willing to subscribe to concrete 
commitments and targets, and the parties are now seeking further ways to deepen their relations. 
Overall what we observe at the steering level of the ENP is an attempt by the EU to move away 
from the conditionality approach of the past towards a relationship based on partnership. This 
‘new approach’ strives for intensifying the policy dialogue based on ‘benchmarks’. The success 
of this strategy depends a lot on the issue area debated and on the country in question.  
4.2  Transfer of legal and institutional models to non-member states 
This type of activity is very prominent in the external dimension of JHA. It is the approach that 
translates the extra-territorialisation strategy most directly. The reliance on this strategy is a 
result of the enlargement experience, during which period the EU was engaged in an intensive 
exercise of norms transfer towards the new member states. The transfer of legal norms stemmed 
from the third Copenhagen criterion, which stated that to become an EU member, the entire 
acquis needed to be transposed into the domestic legal order of the accession states. With 
respect to JHA this meant that the new member states had to transpose the entirety of Titles IV 
TEC containing the provisions on asylum and immigration and Title VI TEU on police and 
judicial cooperation into their legal systems. As a consequence of the incorporation of the 
Schengen provisions into the Treaty of Amsterdam, they also became part of the acquis. During 
the accession process it became apparent that it was not enough to demand that the candidate 
countries incorporate the legal standards; instead the EU needed to provide them with financial 
assistance and expertise to support the implementation of the provisions. The transfer of 
institutional models in the JHA area, through the pre-accession toolkit, consisting of PHARE 
funding, Twinning and TAIEX, became important in the process of bringing the accession 
countries closer to EU standards (De Lobkowicz, 2002) 
The transfer of legal norms to non-member states occurs when the EU demands non-member 
states to adapt their domestic legislation to acquis provisions or international standards. The 
transfer of international standards is frequent in the JHA area, as the JHA acquis contains 
numerous international instruments. Annex I illustrates that a plethora of international 
conventions on JHA-related issues exist, which the EU attempts to transfer to the ENP countries 
through the Action Plans. When considering the table in Annex I we conclude that the overall 
balance sheet of the EU’s norm-promotion efforts in this area is successful. Yet, the fact that a 
country has become party to a Convention does not necessarily mean that it complies with the 
obligations contained in the Conventions; for example a number of the neighbouring countries 
have been seriously deficient in fulfilling their obligations under the Geneva Convention on the 
Status of Refugees (Gil-Bazo, 2006; Human Rights Watch, 2006). There is also a difference in 
norms promotion based on the whether the country is a southern or an eastern EU neighbour, 
because in the eastern region the EU extensively draws on Council of Europe conventions and 
standards. 
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The main tool used for promoting institutional models to the partner countries is Twinning. The 
latter is a cooperation tool aimed at developing the capacity of the public administration in those 
countries. As the projects are carried out by equivalent institutions in EU member states, the aid 
is provided on a ‘peer-to-peer’ basis. Twinning was made available to the neighbouring 
countries when the ENP was launched. The basic rule is that a Twinning project must contain an 
element of alignment with the acquis. In contrast to enlargement during which alignment had to 
be 100%, the extent of alignment with the acquis sought in ENP countries depends on the issues 
under discussion and the country’s willingness to approximate its legislation. Twinnings are 
demand-driven, which means that the non-member states can influence in which sectors they are 
realised; they do, however, need to be related to the domains of cooperation mentioned under 
the PCA or the AA. Twinning was frequently used in the sector of JHA during pre-accession, 
which is confirmed by the fact that 367 of 1,674 Twinnings were carried out on JHA issues 
between 1997 and 2006. This is by far the highest number of Twinnings carried out in a specific 
sector, the next one being agriculture and finance with 281 projects each.
17 
In the relations with the ENP countries, 12 Twinnings have been planned on JHA matters for 
the period of 2004-07. As to the Twinnings being carried out in ENP countries: three are being 
implemented in Morocco – one on border management, one on consumer protection and one 
setting up a Financial Intelligence Unit. Twinnings have also been planned with Jordan in the 
area of penitentiary reform and combating terrorism. Moldova has demanded a Twinning to 
support the Parliament and one related to the administration of justice (e.g. reform of the penalty 
system). With Ukraine a Twinning is planned on the introduction and development of quality 
management within the Ukrainian Police (Ministry of Interior).
18 Twinnings on customs can be 
found in most neighbouring countries. For the time being the demand for Twinning on JHA 
issues is not that high in the ENP countries owing to the sensitivity of the issues dealt with. This 
contrasts strongly with the demand for TAIEX activities, which for its part has been high. 
TAIEX assistance covers a number of short-term activities, such as seminars, study visits and 
workshops. One of the objectives of the TAIEX activities is to prepare the ground for the 
subsequent launching of Twinning activities. In 2006 TAIEX study visits have been planned for 
Jordanian officials to EU member states both on penitentiary reform and on combating 
terrorism.
19 There were also TAIEX seminars organised on trafficking in human beings and a 
study visit on the fight against corruption.  
With respect to the provision of legislative and institutional models we observe a prolongation 
of the modes of interaction developed during eastern enlargement. There is a strong reliance on 
the transfer of legislative provisions to non-member states, which find their origin either in the 
acquis or in international standards. Yet the way in which these institutional models are applied 
in the ENP countries differentiates from what we observed during enlargement, as they are more 
tailored to the needs of the individual countries.  
4.3  Funding and technical assistance for JHA activities in the ENP 
Funding for external assistance activities in the EU is provided based on the geographical 
financial instruments, and not on a sector basis. Simultaneous with the introduction of the ENP 
a new financial instrument, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), 
was introduced. This instrument was to finance the activities with the Neighbours that had 
                                                      
17 Data retrieved from the Twinning Thesaurus, 2007 version. CD Rom was made available by Europeaid. 
18 This information was received during an interview with Europeaid officials in May 2007. They were 
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previously fallen under two different budget lines, TACIS in the former Soviet Union and 
MEDA in Mediterranean countries. The major part of ENPI funding goes to financing bilateral 
technical assistance activities in the neighbouring countries. The ENPI also contains a regional 
envelope for cooperation in both the East and the South, a cross-border cooperation instrument 
for financing activities in border regions including both member states and non-member states 
and an inter-regional cooperation initiative. Moreover, a Governance Facility has been 
introduced in the ENP. This instrument allocates additional financial assistance to countries that 
are willing to introduce reforms in the governance area.  
External assistance under the ENPI is subject to a multi-annual programming cycle. Every six 
years the EC drafts Country Strategy Papers, which elaborate the assistance priorities for the 
following six years; in spring 2007 the documents for the years 2007-2013 were released. These 
documents are adopted following consultations with the partner countries and the other 
international donors. The National Indicative Programmes set out the priority areas of assistance 
for a three-year period, and they allocate the amount of funds to be distributed to specific 
projects. The Annual Work Programmes further specify the Indicative Programmes and allocate 
the funds to the projects that will be carried out during the following year. There are different 
modalities for providing technical assistance to non-member states, but for the most part private 
counterparts (consultants or international organisations, etc.) carry out the activities. The main 
criticisms of the current funding system focus on the rigidity of the system, preventing the 
money from being allocated flexibly in the case of an emergency. Moreover, there are a number 
of problems concerning the limited absorptive capacity of the partner countries and the amount 
of time that the whole process takes. 
Although it is difficult to compare the sums attributed to JHA technical assistance across the 
ENP countries, some interesting conclusions can be drawn from the overview provided in 
Annex II. The fact that justice projects feature prominently in the democracy/governance 
component in all ENP countries and that JHA is a priority sector for administrative capacity-
building and regulatory alignment in the Neighbourhood reveals that JHA-related funding 
constitutes an important part of ENPI assistance overall. This observation is confirmed, if we 
consider the number of projects financed under the regional and the cross-border programmes of 
the ENPI dealing with JHA issues. Indeed, the projects in the regional programmes lay a strong 
emphasis on networking law enforcement authorities in the respective regions, so that they can 
combat common challenges in a more efficient manner. In addition, the management of external 
borders is an important priority in the cross-border cooperation programmes. These programmes 
are meant to intensify the contacts between the ENP countries and their immediate neighbouring 
countries in the EU. 
Apart from the funding granted under the geographic budget lines, technical assistance can also 
be financed through the thematic budget lines. Amongst the thematic budget lines the one on 
migration and asylum is most directly linked to activities in the JHA field. The thematic budget 
line on migration and asylum supports activities in the neighbouring countries that are aimed at 
enhancing their protection capacities, fighting irregular migration and accompanying 
readmission agreements, promoting well-managed labour migration, fostering the links between 
migration and development and protecting migrants against exploitation and exclusion 
(European Commission, 2006e). The thematic budget line on human rights, which is going to 
replace the EIDHR, will make funds available for projects in the area of criminal justice. The 
granting of these ‘human rights’ funds is different from the traditional technical assistance under 
the ENPI, as the disbursal of funds is not made dependent upon the consent of the partner 
countries’ authorities (Council of the European Union, 1999). Hence the money can be used to 
finance access to justice projects supporting NGOs or bar associations. Lastly, under Article 4 
of the Stability Instrument, the EC can make available technical and financial assistance in the 12 | NICOLE WICHMANN 
 
context of stable conditions for cooperation in the pursuit of specific aims, such as “threats to 
law and order, to the security and safety of individuals, to critical infrastructure and to public 
health” (Council of the European Union, 2006: 4). Article 4 makes explicit reference to the 
possibility of funding activities in the area of counter-terrorism, narcotics, customs and 
immigration law and law enforcement issues more generally. 
The lack of a specific funding instrument attributed to funding the external dimension of JHA is 
one of the major obstacles to its realisation. One way in which JHA specific money can be made 
available to non-member states is through the internal programmes, on law enforcement 
cooperation. Under these programmes organisations (governmental and non-governmental) in 
the EU member states can apply for implementing a project in which they cooperate with 
partner organisations from ENP countries. The difficulty for non-member states is that under 
these calls for tender they cannot submit project proposals themselves; they are dependent on 
EU member states asking them to join. When a topic is of interest to both an ENP and an EU 
country, this type of cooperation does occur, such as the AGIS projects on anti-trafficking in 
which EU member states cooperated with Moldova and Ukraine. A further example for an 
internal instrument that includes a reference to non-member state participation is the call 
launched under the ‘Commission programme for the prevention of and response to violent 
radicalisation’. This programme description specifies: 
Trans-national projects of the type described above aimed at tackling violent 
radicalisation, which involve partners in at least two member states or at least one 
member state and an applicant country or a country within the Euro-Med region, will 
be given preference.
20  
A number of interviewees in the European institutions confirmed that a lack of financing was 
one of the major problems in realising the external dimension. The current system makes the 
funding of JHA-related projects entirely dependent upon the money managed by RELEX. There 
is apparently an ongoing debate on whether more JHA ‘internal’ money could be made 
available for cooperation with non-member states.   
In the area of technical assistance, we once again find evidence for the existence of an 
interesting mix of measures based on the logics of conditionality and social learning. A further 
interesting finding in the context of funding is the difficulty that the EU is facing in establishing 
financial instruments to pay for JHA specific measures in the external dimension. In the next 
section, we will flag some of these JHA-specific tools. 
4.4  Inter-governmental negotiations  
In the context of enlargement, ‘gate-keeping’ refers to the process of granting or refusing a 
candidate country to reach the next stage in the accession process. It is the most powerful 
instrument that the EU can use to foster compliance on the side of the partner states. In the 
interactions with the ENP countries, the EU cannot use this tool, as there is no accession 
prospect for the countries concerned. In fact the ENP was explicitly conceived as an alternative 
to, and not a preparation for enlargement, although recently the ENP official language has 
changed. In the case of European (i.e. Eastern) neighbours, future membership is not completely 
ruled out in future. So when it comes to negotiating on JHA issues with ENP countries, the EU 
has to find ways of devising package deals that contain sufficiently attractive incentives for the 
partner country to adopt their behaviour to the EU’s demands. Within the ENP a certain amount 
of issue linkage takes place, as progress in one area can be rewarded with a concession in 
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another area. For example cooperation on the environment can be rewarded by facilitating 
access to the internal market. Although inter-linkage between issues is always an option for the 
EU, at times the partner countries explicitly ask for concessions on the issue area under 
discussion. For example in the case of negotiations on JHA the partner countries frequently ask 
for rewards in this area. The incentives the EU can offer in the JHA area are money, mobility 
partnerships and capacity-building. It is important to note that negotiations only occur in issue 
areas in which both sides, the EU and the partner country, have a strong interest and when both 
have something to offer to the other party. In the next section we will take a closer look at two 
case studies, irregular immigration and terrorism, which will show us how the EU devises 
package deals that are supposed to respect the wishes of both parties. 
4.5  Two mini-case studies 
4.5.1  Irregular Immigration 
In the area of irregular migration, the EU has declared the negotiation of readmission 
agreements as a priority matter in the relations with the ENP countries. The objective of 
concluding a readmission agreement with Morocco has led to the convening of at least nine 
rounds of negotiations,
21 but for the time being no agreement has been finalized (Bouteillet, 
2003). Morocco has demanded a number of concessions, amongst them visa facilitation and a 
substantial increase of funds devoted to socio-economic development. Furthermore, it has 
demanded an increase of funds to deal with the transit migrants from Sub Saharan Africa. A 
number of participants in the negotiations with Morocco have confirmed that these talks have 
contributed to the elaboration of the so-called ‘global approach’ on migration, which the EU has 
been advocating since the Hampton Court Summit in November 2005. The global approach 
constitutes an explicit attempt to devise package deals in the area of mobility. It tries to satisfy 
the demands of the EU and those of the partner countries. In other words, it strives to balance 
the EU’s desire to get the partner countries to do more in the fight against irregular migration 
with the partner countries’ demands for opening channels of legal migration, visa facilitation 
and socio-economic development. 
The policy discourse surrounding the need for a more comprehensive, balanced or global 
approach to migration is by no means a novelty in the EU, but it has only led to the elaboration 
of concrete policy measures in recent times. In terms of the production of policy papers, the 
global approach has been developing at an astounding speed over the last two years. The first 
document to be published was the Commission Communication following up the Hampton 
Court European Council Conclusions (European Commission, 2005b). This document focuses 
specifically on cooperation with the Mediterranean neighbours and the African states. It was 
complemented by a Communication on ‘one year on in the implementation of the global 
approach’ (European Commission, 2006f), which draws up a balance sheet of the first year of 
implementation of the global approach. The process of elaborating the global approach 
culminated in the adoption of two Communications, one on circular migration (European 
Commission, 2007b) and one on applying the global approach to the neighbours in the East and 
the South-East (European Commission, 2007a) in May 2007. These documents cross-reference 
to the other texts, and hence we are led to conclude that the four Communications together 
express the global approach. 
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16 June 2007. 14 | NICOLE WICHMANN 
 
The Communication on circular migration and migration partnerships lists a number of 
concessions in the area of irregular migration that the EU demands from the partner countries 
(readmission, border management, exchange of information), and it enumerates the 
commitments that the EC and the member states could possibly make. In this context the 
Communication recommends improving channels of legal migration to the EU (mainly for 
seasonal workers and the highly skilled), establishing mechanisms for matching labour supply 
and labour demand, providing migration capacity-building and on the issuance of multiple entry 
visas for certain categories of people. Since the relations on migration questions are more 
advanced with the Eastern neighbours, we will take a look at how the global approach has 
materialised in the relations with these countries. Overall we find a strengthened commitment 
on the side of the partner countries to intensify the fight against irregular migration, expressed 
through their willingness to sign readmission agreements with the EU, and to conclude working 
arrangements with Frontex. In return the EU commits itself to providing technical assistance, 
capacity building, visa facilitation, visa policy and mobility partnerships.  
In terms of concrete realisations one needs to mention firstly, the signing of a readmission and 
visa facilitation agreement with Ukraine. In the margins of the EU-Ukraine Cooperation 
Council, a readmission agreement was signed with Ukraine on 18 June 2007. The readmission 
agreement sets out obligations and procedures for the authorities of both Ukraine and the 
respective EU member state as to when and how to take back people who are illegally residing 
on their territories. The readmission obligations cover nationals from Ukraine, the EU member 
states and those from partner countries and stateless people. With respect to the latter two 
categories, a transitional period of two years was agreed upon, before Ukraine has to readmit 
these categories of people. The agreement also contains safeguards with regard to data 
protection and the protection of fundamental human rights.
22 To ease the strain on the 
readmission obligations for the Eastern neighbours, the EU is increasing the financial assistance 
provided to these countries in the area of migration and asylum. One area in which the lack of 
resources is particularly pronounced is that of reception facilities for asylum seekers and 
irregular migrants. Provided the identified gaps in the asylum systems that result both from a 
lack of resources and other protection related difficulties, the EU has developed the concept of 
Regional Protection Programmes (RPP) to tackle asylum issues in a comprehensive manner. 
RPP combine elements of capacity-building, support for infrastructures and training on human 
rights. A pilot RPP is being set up in Ukraine (European Commission, 2005c; Human Rights 
Watch, 2006).  
In return for the readmission agreement, an agreement on visa facilitation was signed. The latter 
agreement limits the fee for a visa application to €35, which is definitely cheaper than the €60 
foreseen in the Common Consular Instructions (Boratynski et al., 2006; Szymborska, 2007: 
278-279). Moreover, the agreement indicates that some Ukrainian citizens, in particular minors, 
disabled and others, can be exempt from paying the application fees. The Agreement also 
stipulates that all applications must be handled in a time frame of 10 days, whereby in 
individual cases this can be extended to 30 days. The difficulty with this rule is that it does not 
start counting on the day on which the person had the first contacts with the embassy of a 
Schengen state. It is indeed this pre-submission process that is cumbersome for the applicants, 
provided that all of the documents then need to be collected. Lastly, the agreement allows for 
granting certain categories of Ukrainian citizens, close relatives, lorry drivers, people on 
business, students, journalists and members of official delegations, multi-entry visas to the EU. 
For these categories the agreement also reduces the number of documents that are required to 
complete the visa application process. On the downside the analysts note that in the eyes of the 
Ukrainian population the agreement discriminates between the few who can benefit from the 
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simplified visa procedure, and the ordinary citizen, who cannot. In Ukraine this seems to be 
interpreted as a sign that the EU prefers cooperating with the Ukrainian elites instead of the 
population (Boratynski et al., 2006: 2; Szymborska, 2007: 279).  
Secondly, with respect to operational cooperation, the EU provides direct assistance to Moldova 
and Ukraine. Operational assistance is provided through the EU Border Assistance Mission, 
EUBAM, which the involved parties consider a success so far.
23 Operational cooperation is also 
being strengthened through the conclusion of Frontex working arrangements with the Eastern 
partner countries. Indeed, Frontex has the capacity to enter into agreements with non-member 
countries (Carrera, 2007; Jorry, 2007). According to Article 14 of the Frontex regulation, the 
Agency “shall facilitate the operational cooperation between member states and non-member 
states, in the framework of the European Union external relations policy” (Council of the 
European Union, 2004c: 5). The neighbouring countries are second in line after agreements 
have been concluded with the accession and candidate countries. The first step in establishing 
relations with Frontex is the conclusion of a working arrangement (protocols and/or memoranda 
of understanding). The first-ever working arrangement was concluded with Russia in November 
2006. In the margin of the JHA Council in June 2007, a working arrangement was also 
concluded with Ukraine. According to S. Carrera (2007: 18), informal contacts have also been 
established between Morocco, Algeria, Egypt and Lebanon. Before Frontex operations can take 
place, bilateral agreements need to exist between the country in charge of the operation and the 
neighbouring countries, but unfortunately the content of these agreements is not publicly known 
(Carrera, 2007: 20).  
Thirdly, the EU is attempting to make concessions with respect to facilitating the arduous visa 
procedures. The agreement on visa facilitation initialled with Moldova on 25 April 2007, 
introduces a number of aspects aimed at easing the visa issuing procedure.
24 For example the 
agreement foresees the creation of a Common Visa Application Centre. The Common Visa 
Application Centre, which is located in the Hungarian embassy in Chisinau, has been joined by 
Austria, Slovenia, and Latvia, and in the future Denmark and Estonia. This Centre will deliver 
Schengen visas to Moldavians on behalf of the aforementioned EU member states. Provided 
that many of the participating countries do not have diplomatic or consular representations in 
Chisinau, this Centre will provide an opportunity for Moldovan citizens to lodge an application 
in their country. They no longer have to travel to Ukraine or Romania to apply for a Schengen 
visa. 
On the whole the EU is trying to make concessions on visa policy, because it knows that the 
issue of mobility is crucial for the neighbouring countries (Grabbe, 2000; Jileva, 2003). The 
Commission acknowledges this in the Communication on enhancing the relations with the ENP 
countries (European Commission, 2006b). The analysis of the realisation of the global approach 
in the relations with the Eastern neighbours reveals that the EU is using a number of instruments 
in the field of migration to make cooperation more attractive for the partner countries. The EU 
is providing the partner countries with know-how and support on how to manage migration and 
asylum in the framework of the Regional Protection Programme, it is attempting to facilitate 
movement between the EU and the partner countries, and it offers operational support for border 
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management, as in the case of EUBAM. On the whole the negotiations on irregular migration 
are characterised by an interesting mix of material incentives and the promotion of soft skills. It 
remains to be seen how successful this strategy will be in fostering change in the behaviour of 
the partner countries. 
4.5.2  Terrorism 
European Commissioner Franco Frattini has proclaimed that “we must build a network of 
security against the network of terror” (Frattini, 2006: 135). One component of this ‘network of 
security’ is the establishment of closer contacts with the partner countries in the 
Neighbourhood. One of the main techniques in this regard is the intensification of political 
dialogue. For the time being the EU has chosen a two-pronged approach to the fight against 
terrorism in the Mediterranean, a multilateral and a bilateral one. In the framework of the 
‘Barcelona plus Ten’ meeting in November 2005, the EU adopted a ‘Code of Conduct’ in the 
fight against terrorism.
25 Whilst the Code has been criticised for containing neither a definition 
nor any concrete obligations to enhance effective international cooperation, it is nonetheless 
important, because it contains a commitment by the Barcelona process participants to condemn 
all forms of terrorist acts and it reiterates their intention to tackle the causes of terrorism and 
radicalisation (Bicchi & Martin, 2006; Reinares, 2006). Moreover, it lists a number of 
international instruments and standards, mainly concluded in the framework of the UN that the 
partners need to respect in the fight against terrorism. That this fight is not always carried out in 
accordance with international human rights standards has been pointed out on numerous 
occasions by human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch.
26 
On the bilateral level we have witnessed the insertion of clauses on counter-terrorism 
cooperation in agreements with non-member states. These clauses are modelled on the Standard 
Counter-Terrorism clause agreed by Coreper (Council of the European Union, 2004a).
27 The 
clause reiterates the commitment of the parties to intensify their fight against terrorism. 
Moreover, the clauses acknowledge that the UN documents should serve as a reference point in 
the fight against terrorism. In addition the clauses contain a commitment by the states to 
enhance the exchange of information on terrorist groups and the exchange of views on the 
means and methods used to fight terrorism.
28 The list of countries with which the EU has sought 
to include a counter-terrorism clause, has not been made public to date. A counter-terrorism 
clause has been inserted in the Association Agreement concluded with Algeria, and in an 
exchange of letters on the fight of terrorism with Lebanon.
29 Moreover, all ENP Action Plans 
contain an action on enhancing the fight against terrorism.  
In exchange for enhanced political dialogue on terrorism, the EU offers to increase the exchange 
of information and the transfer of best practices with and to the Mediterranean countries. In this 
regard the EU can offer the conclusion of cooperation agreements with the agencies and 
coordinating bodies, Europol and Eurojust. The ENP countries have explicitly voiced their 
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26 See for example Amnesty on the Algerian authorities 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGIOR610062002?open&of=ENG-2D3. See also Wolff, 2006a. 
27 ‘Coreper’ is The Permanent Representatives Committee (Article 207 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community). Coreper is responsible for preparing the work of the Council of the European 
Union. It consists of the member states' ambassadors to the European Union (‘Permanent 
Representatives’) and is chaired by the member state that holds the Council Presidency. 
28 http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/may/eu-terr-clauses.pdf. Consulted on 17 June 2007. 
29 http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/news/patten/sp02_288.htm. Consulted on 17 June 2007. THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN JHA & THE ENP | 17 
 
interest in expanding these contacts with the EU (European Commission, 2006c). Europol can 
conclude strategic and operational agreements with non-member states based on the Council 
Decision of 27 March 2000 and the subsequent updates extending the range of countries to 
Moldova, Ukraine and Morocco (Council of the European Union, 2004b; Europol, 2004c). The 
main difference between an operational and a strategic agreement relates to the exchange of 
personal data. Under a strategic agreement the exchange of personal data is not possible, whilst 
it can be done under the terms of the operational agreement (Rijken, 2001). The only ENP 
country with which the negotiations on a strategic agreement have been concluded is Moldova. 
Most ENP partner countries have expressed their interest in negotiating operational agreements 
with Europol, but for this to happen a number of obstacles in the area of data protection need to 
be eliminated (Europol, 2004b).  
In the area of judicial cooperation the EU offers the Mediterranean countries opportunities to 
enhance the contacts between magistrates and judges on both sides of the Mediterranean. The 
main incentives the EU can offer in this area are Eurojust cooperation agreements and the 
setting up of European Judicial Network contact points (EJN). Eurojust can negotiate 
cooperation agreements with non-member states. For the time being Eurojust has not concluded 
any agreements with Mediterranean countries, as data protection continues to constitute a 
problem in all ENP countries (Council of the European Union, 2007b). In the absence of a 
cooperation agreement Eurojust can convene – subject to a unanimous vote of the Eurojust 
College of Prosecutors – a meeting with prosecutors from a partner country, if there is evidence 
that cooperation with that country is necessary for prosecuting a case of cross-border crime. 
Apparently such working meetings have been convened with Morocco on terrorism. The legal 
basis for convening such meetings is the existence of bilateral agreements on mutual legal 
assistance between EU member states and the respective non-member countries. This is 
possible, because Eurojust prosecutors are endowed with the same powers as national 
prosecutors. They can hence rely on the mutual legal assistance agreements concluded between 
the non-member country and their member state of origin. Lastly, there exists the option of 
establishing EJN contact points in ENP countries through which judicial contacts between the 
EU states and the ENP countries can be facilitated.  
Apart from promising more exchange of information on terrorism, the EU is also an active 
provider of capacity-building in the fight against terrorism at the bilateral and at the multilateral 
level. At the bilateral level the ENP countries are among the main beneficiary countries of 
counter-terrorism technical assistance projects. In fact, Algeria and Morocco were the two 
countries in which pilot projects on counter-terrorism were conducted (Council of the European 
Union, 2007a). These projects focus on administrative capacity-building; they normally 
concentrate on police cooperation, justice cooperation, customs cooperation and border 
management. The projects normally also include efforts to upgrade anti-money laundering 
legislation and activities on combating the financing of terrorism. It is at times difficult to 
clearly separate technical assistance on terrorism from that provided to combat other forms of 
organised and economic crime.
30  
At the regional level we find the Euromed Police and Justice projects. The Euromed Police 
project is being implemented by the European Police College (European Police College, 2006). 
Little information is available about this programme. What is known is that the CEPOL project 
focuses on transmitting best practices in the area of policing to the Mediterranean partner 
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countries.
31 A short glimpse at the Euromed Synopses confirms that the fight against terrorism 
is one of the issues on which training sessions have been carried out.
32 In the framework of the 
Euromed Justice regional project the EU cooperates with the European Institute for Public 
Administration, EIPA, in carrying out seminars on a number of questions related to terrorism. A 
strong focus in the Euromed Justice programme has been laid on prosecuting the financing of 
terrorism. The seminars are geared towards high-level magistrates in the ENP countries. They 
should then disseminate the knowledge they gained in these seminars to the lower-level judges 
in their home countries.
33 
One the whole in the fight against terrorism we observe a tendency on the side of the EU to 
intensify contacts with the Mediterranean countries on the bilateral and the regional level. In 
exchange for political dialogue on terrorism the EU offers an intensification of information 
exchange, technical assistance and capacity-building for the law enforcement authorities in the 
partner countries. For the most part the EU has to rely on transmitting ‘software’ to the partner 
countries in the form of dialogue and capacity-building. The reason for this is that the 
‘hardware’, such as infrastructure support, intelligence, military, policemen and gendarmes, are 
not part of the EU competences. Good contacts with the member states are indispensable in the 
international fight against terrorism, because many partner countries are interested in the 
‘hardware’, which only the member states can provide. 
These sections on negotiations have showed that in the areas of both irregular migration and 
terrorism we witness an increased reliance on instruments of social learning to make the partner 
countries more willing to cooperate with the EU. It remains an open question whether these 
incentives will really entice the partner countries to change their behaviour. It also became 
apparent in this section, that when coming up with ‘incentives packages’ the Commission is 
constantly confronted with its limits in terms of competence. All of the documents issued on the 
global approach and on the fight against terrorism manifest the enormous caution with which 
the Commission goes about cooperation in this area.  
5. Conclusions 
This paper has attempted to convey the message that the ENP is a multi-layered policy. In fact 
one could allege that the ENP is an umbrella that has come to encompass a number of different 
policy objectives and instruments under one and the same heading. The ENP is an 
amalgamation of different policy objectives and instruments that need to be analysed and 
considered in their own right. The argument on the multi-layered nature was made by taking a 
look at the origins and the major policy documents making up the policy. The argument was 
advanced that since the outset two discourses have surrounded the ENP, one that considers it a 
security initiative and another that sees it as a broader socio-economic transformation project. 
These two discourses translate into conflicting strategies: firstly, a long-term strategy of 
enhancing security by promoting democracy and the rule of law in neighbouring countries and 
secondly, a short-term one that advocates punctual short term measures to strengthen the 
capacities of law enforcement authorities to tackle a broad range of threats spanning the entire 
                                                      
31 CEPOL is the European Police College. CEPOL brings together senior police officers across Europe 
with the aim to encourage cross-border co-operation in the fight against crime, public security and law 
and order. 
32 See for example the Euromed synopsis of 4 March 2004: 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/synopsis/synopsis262_en.pdf. Consulted on 4 July 2007. 
33 Information on Euromed Justice can be retrieved from the following website http://www.eipa.eu/en/ 
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security continuum. It is at the level of the policy objectives that political guidelines need to be 
formulated that take into account the potential trade-offs between the two objectives. 
Despite these opposing logics the paper goes on to allege that there is a unifying objective that 
is common to all JHA measures. Indeed, the objective of ‘extraterritorialising’ the management 
of internal security threats to the neighbouring countries permeates the entire policy initiative. 
There are, however, two different logics of action that underlie the extraterritorialisation 
objective, one draws on conditionality and the other one on social learning. The paper goes on 
to show that the four categories of conditionality instruments are also inspired by social 
learning.  
The most interesting finding of this paper pertains to the enormous diversity that we find in the 
relations with the various partner countries. In fact the practice with respect to benchmarking 
and monitoring of progress differs from country to country. At the one extreme we find focused 
discussions, such as with Ukraine, whereas at the other end, exemplified by Tunisia in this 
study, there is no dialogue for the time being. The way in which progress is monitored combines 
elements of conditionality and social learning. At the level of the transfer of legislative and 
institutional models, we find an attempt to entice the ENP countries into incorporating EU or 
international standards in their domestic legislation. The ‘flanking measures’ accompanying 
legislative approximation are Twinning and TAIEX. With respect to the implementation of 
these instruments the EU strives to achieve a high level of co-ownership and dialogue. 
Respecting the partnership principle is important, because it is only in this way that the EU can 
adapt the instruments to the circumstances in the partner countries. A third finding was that the 
amount of technical assistance and funding dedicated to JHA measures in ENP partner countries 
has substantially increased over the last years, as the section on funding the external dimension 
of JHA illustrated. Lastly, in the context of technical assistance we find an interesting mixture 
of norms transfer and capacity-building, which is by definition inspired by conditionality and 
social learning. 
The paper spends some space elaborating on the fourth conditionality-inspired instrument, 
namely that of negotiations. It has been argued that negotiations with ENP countries need to 
focus on the costs and benefits within specific sectors, as there is no membership prospect that 
outweighs the costs of making concessions in any one given sector. The EU draws up package 
deals to get partner countries to cooperate on the questions of irregular immigration and 
terrorism. As a matter of fact, the EU mixes a number of material incentives and soft measures, 
such as capacity-building, to influence the partner country’s cost/benefit calculation. In the area 
of irregular migration the EU has proved some creativity in providing incentives that might be 
of interest to the partner countries. On terrorism-related questions, however, the range of 
incentives is more limited; this is probably a consequence of the absence of EU competence in 
this field. Overall this overview of negotiations concludes that it remains to be seen if the 
incentives are strong enough to entice the partner countries to adapt to the EU’s demands. 
What comes to the fore in the whole paper is the enormous diversity that the common policy 
framework, ENP, has to accommodate. This diversity constitutes an obstacle to the EU’s 
capacity to project itself as an actor in the international arena. The analysis reveals that there are 
major differences across policy issues and countries. It is an open question whether, as time 
passes, the differences will narrow or whether they will become more accentuated. A number of 
interesting research tasks result from this alleged diversity. There is indeed a need for analysts 
to carry out rigorous comparative work identifying which factors account for the variation 
between the countries and the issue areas, and specifying the conditions under which successful 
JHA cooperation can emerge. 20 | NICOLE WICHMANN 
 
6. Policy  Recommendations 
This analysis of the JHA elements in the ENP has led us to formulate a number of policy 
recommendations: 
•  The EU should draft an Action-Oriented Paper (AOP) on Cooperation with the ENP 
countries that provide us with a better insight into what the EU is doing in this area. The 
AOP should also include references to the state of security-sector governance in these 
countries (judicial oversight, questions of accountability). It would be desirable that, in 
parallel to the AOPs, human rights compliance reports would be released on the 
countries with which the EU is seeking to expand cooperation on JHA issues.
34 
•  The idea of drawing up an AOP on counter-terrorism cooperation with the 
Mediterranean countries should be pursued. The fight against terrorism is the area in 
which the tensions between the various objectives are most likely to occur. 
•  In terms of the monitoring and benchmarking provisions, the EU should consider 
moving towards the Ukraine JHA Action Plan model with all countries, as this seems to 
provide a fruitful framework for dialogue. 
•  If the EU is serious about building an external dimension to JHA it will have to think 
about the financing of these activities. It cannot continue to be entirely dependent on the 
external relations financial instruments. 
•  As regards negotiations one is led to conclude that the EU will need to make more 
substantial concessions on JHA issues to change the cost/benefit calculations of the 
partner countries. The Commission Communication on mobility partnerships and 
circular migration undeniably constitutes a step in the right direction, but for it to 
produce tangible effects it probably has to offer more. For obvious reasons the question 
of the incentives is intrinsically linked to that of competence distribution between the 
EU and the member states. It is a well known fact that such questions can only be 
addressed in a more comprehensive framework, that of Treaty Reform. 
•  There is a need to increase the dialogue between the various actors involved in the ENP 
and the external dimension of JHA. The flow of information between the strategic level 
at which the policy objectives are formulated and the level of policy implementation 
needs to be enhanced. This would allow for a more coordinated use of the entire 
spectrum of policy instruments. It is imperative that the EU do this, if it wants to be 
taken seriously as an international actor. 
                                                      
34 This recommendation is voiced in the draft report of the EP LIBE Committee (European Parliament - 
Committee on Civil Liberties and Justice and Home Affairs, 2007).  
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Annex I. Legislative approximation efforts
35 
 
Relevant international conventions in the areas of asylum & trafficking 
in human beings 
Country Refugee  Status 
Convention 1951 
Protocol on 
Refugee Status 
1967 
European 
Convention on 
Human Rights 
1951 
Organisation of 
African Unity 
Refugee 
Convention 
  Signed Rat. 
Acc(a) 
Succ(d) 
Signed Rat. 
Acc(a) 
Succ(d) 
Signed Rat. 
 
Signed Rat. 
 
Algeria   1963d   1967a      1974 
Armenia    1993a   1993a   2002     
Azerbaijan    1993a   1993a   2002     
Belarus    2001a   2001a        
Egypt    1981a   1981a       1980 
Georgia    1999a   1999a   1999     
Israel   1954   1968a       
Jordan              
Lebanon             1981 
Libya              
Moldova    2002a   2002a   1997     
Morocco   1956d   1971a      1974 
Syria              
Tunisia    1957d   1968d       1989 
Ukraine    2002a   2002a        
 
                                                      
35 These tables have been adapted from (Lavenex & Wichmann, 2006). THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN JHA & THE ENP | 27 
 
International conventions on fighting trafficking in human beings 
 
 
International Convention on 
Transnational Organised Crime 
(Palermo Convention) 
Optional Protocol on Trafficking 
in Persons, particularly Women 
and Children 
Algeria  2002 2004 
Armenia  2003 2003 
Azerbaijan  2003 2003 
Belarus  2003 2003 
Georgia  2006    2006 
Egypt  2004 2004 
Israel  2006  signed in 2001, not ratified 
Jordan  signed in 2002, not ratified  not signed 
Lebanon  2005 2005 
Libya  2004 2004 
Moldova  2005 2005 
Morocco  2002 not  signed 
PA  N/A N/A 
Syria  signed in 2000, not ratified  signed in 2000, not ratified 
Tunisia  2003 2003 
Ukraine  2004 2004 
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International conventions and monitoring mechanisms on corruption 
 
  United 
Nations 
Convention 
Against 
Corruption 
2003  
Council of 
Europe  
Criminal Law 
Convention 
Council of 
Europe   
Civil Law 
Convention 
GRECO
36 OECD   
Anti-
Corruption 
Network 
for 
Transition 
Economies 
(ACN) 
Algeria  Ratification        
Armenia  Ratification Ratification  Ratification  x  x 
Azerbaijan  Ratification Ratification  Ratification  x  x 
Belarus  Ratification        
Egypt  Ratification        
Georgia   Signature  Ratification  x  x 
Israel  Signature        
Jordan  Ratification        
Lebanon          
Libya  Signature        
Moldova  Signature Ratification  Ratification  x   
Morocco  Ratification -  -     
Palestine   - -  -  - 
Syria  Signature -  -     
Tunisia  Signature -  -     
Ukraine  Signature Signature  Ratification  x  x 
 
                                                      
36 The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) was established in 1999 by the Council of Europe to 
monitor States’ compliance with the organisation’s anti-corruption standards. THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN JHA & THE ENP | 29 
 
International instruments on money laundering* 
 
 Compliance 
with FATF 
Recommen-
dations 
 
1990 Council of 
Europe Convention 
on laundering, 
search, seizure and 
confiscation of the 
proceeds from 
crime  
1999 UN 
Conv. on 
Financing 
of 
Terrorism 
Membership in a Peer 
Review Mechanism 
Algeria     Ratification  MENA-FATF 
Armenia  Partially Yes  Ratification  Moneyval 
Azerbaijan  Partially Yes  Ratification  Moneyval 
Belarus     Ratification  Eurasian  Group 
Egypt  Yes   Ratification  MENA-FATF 
Georgia   Yes  Yes  Moneyval 
Israel  Yes   Ratification   
Jordan     Ratification  MENA-FATF 
Lebanon  Yes   No  MENA-FATF 
Libya     Ratification   
Moldova  No Yes  Ratification  Moneyval 
Morocco     Ratification  MENA-FATF 
Syria     Ratification  MENA-FATF 
Tunisia     Ratification  MENA-FATF 
Ukraine  Yes Yes  Ratification  Moneyval 
* Information retrieved from 2007 Report of US State Department can be found on 
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2007/vol2/html/80886.htm  
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Annex II. Funding the JHA elements in ENP countries 
Country  Total 
allocation 
(mio euro)
1 
JHA allocation 
(mio euro) 
Specification of activities 
Algeria  220 17   
 
24 
Justice project 
Supporting activities to the Association 
Agreement (migration, organized crime 
related measures mentioned) 
Armenia  98.4  29.52 Democracy/Good 
Governance 
29.52 Regulatory Reform 
and Administrative Capacity 
Building 
Justice listed as one sub priority 
 
JHA (border management and migration) 
mentioned as areas in which 
administrative capacity building is 
necessary 
Azerbaijan  92  30 Democratic 
Development/Good 
Governance 
Rule of Law and Justice Reform listed as 
one priority. Also mentioning of public 
sector reform to enhance fight against 
corruption and fight against organized 
crime. 
Belarus  20  14 Social and Economic 
Development 
Administrative capacity building on JHA 
issues mentioned as a possible target for 
support 
Egypt  558 10 
 
13 
Modernisation of Administration of 
Justice and enhancement of security 
Good Governance and Decentralisation 
(fight against corruption one element) 
Georgia  120.4  31 Democracy, Rule of Law 
and Governance 
Sub priority 2 on Rule of Law and 
Criminal Justice Reform. 
Sub priority 3 on Good Governance and 
Administrative Capacity Building (incl. 
fight against corruption). 
Israel  8  2 acquis related activities in 
key ministries 
JHA mentioned as one sector in which 
Israelis are interested in cooperating. 
Jordan  265  17 Political reform, 
democracy, human rights, 
good governance, justice 
and co-operation in the fight 
against extremism 
 
30 Good Governance, 
Transparency, Regulatory 
alignment 
JUST – strengthening capacity of the 
judiciary 
Support to Amman message (against 
terrorism and extremism) 
 
Support to implementing Action Plan 
Programme (fight against corruption, 
organized crime, terrorism and financing 
of terrorism). 
Lebanon  187  10 sub-priority 2 on Justice, 
Liberty and Security. 
Support efficiency and 
independence of the 
judiciary 
Activities in area of justice reform and 
penitentiary reform. 
Libya
2  8    
Moldova  209.7  52-73 Support for 
Democratic Development 
and Good Governance 
31-41 Administrative 
capacity-building and 
regulatory reform 
Activities in the area of justice reform and 
fight against corruption are mentioned. 
The areas of asylum/migration and border 
management are mentioned in this 
context. THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN JHA & THE ENP | 31 
 
Morocco  654  20 Governance and human 
rights 
50 Vocational Training 
Support for Ministry of Justice 
 
One of the measures to combat sources of 
emigration in the long run 
Palestinian 
Authority
2 
632    
Syria  130  10   Modernising the judiciary 
Tunisia  300  30 for Policy Action Plan   Covers the sections of the ENP AP not 
included in the following NIP (e.g. JHA) 
Ukraine  494  148.2 Support for 
Democratic Development 
and Good Governance 
148.2 Support for 
administrative capacity 
building and regulatory 
reform 
197.6 Support for 
infrastructure development 
Rule of law and judicial reform 
programme 
 
Mentioning of migration/asylum and 
border management as priority sectors 
 
Border management figures as one of the 
sub priorities in this regard. 
Regional 
Programmes 
Mediterranean 
Eastern 
Europe 
343 
 
223.5 
13 Justice, Security and 
Migration 
20-30% allocated to Border 
and Migration Management, 
the Fight against 
Transnational Organised 
Crime, and Customs (20-
30%) 
 
ENPI Cross 
Border 
Cooperation 
Initiative 
583   Border management and addressing 
common challenges 
Thematic 
budget line for 
enhancing 
cooperation 
with countries 
on migration 
matters
4 
   Commitment that up to 3% of ENPI will 
be made available for migration related 
issues
3 
Stability 
Instrument
4 
   Contains provisions on financing 
activities in the areas of terrorism and 
organized crime 
Thematic 
budget line on 
human rights
4 
   Some activities on access to justice can be 
financed under this budget line. 
 
1 Information retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/0703_enpi_figures_en.pdf (consulted on 13 
June 2007). 
2 Planning figures only. Since medium-term programming is not possible for the Palestinian Authority and 
Libya, no Strategy Papers and Indicative Programmes have been adopted. Co-operation with Libya will only be fully 
activated when necessary preconditions are in place. 
3 Reference to this number can be found in the one year update to the global approach on migration (European 
Commission, 2006d). 
4 The thematic programming documents are not yet available at time of writing (19 June 2007). 